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Abstract. In the article, results of the research on the development of methods and models of
intellectual recognition of threats to information systems of transport. The article contains
results of the research that allows us to raise the level of protection of the automated and
intellectual information systems of the transportation enterprises (AISTE) in the conditions
of the intensification of transportation. The article contains mathematical models and results
of estimation information systems having Internet connection through various communication
channels. The article also considers the issues of research and protection of the AISTE under
the condition of several conflict-data-request threads.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The influence of information automation systems pervades many aspects of everyday
life in most parts of the world. In the shape of factory and process control systems, they
enable high productivity in industrial production and transport systems, essentially
providing the backbone of technical civilization. One of the foremost transport business
security concerns is the protection of critical information, both within their internal
financial infrastructures and from external elements. Now, more and more open and
standardized Internet technologies (e-business, e-logistics, e-cargo, etc.) are used for
that purpose.
The focus on cyber security is increasing rapidly due to the many high-profile
and highly disruptive/damaging security breaches that threaten financial and physical
damage across critical national and corporate infrastructures. It also appears that the
nature of the threat is changing (Ahmad et al., 2005, p. 170).
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The automated systems on transportation vary in the technologies applied, from
basic management systems such as car navigation, traffic signal control systems,
container management systems, variable message signs, automatic number plate
recognition, and speed cameras to monitoring applications such as security CCTV
systems, and to more-advanced applications that integrate live data and feedback from
a number of other sources, such as parking guidance and information systems, weather
information, and the like.
A Transportation Management System (TMS) is a software system designed to
manage transportation operations. TMS is one of the systems managing the supply
chain. They belong to a sub-group called Supply chain execution (SCE). TMS, whether
it is part of an Enterprise Level ERP System, has become a critical part of any (SCE).
The block diagram of a typical control system for transportation can be seen in
Figure 1.
In a rapidly changing external and internal business environment, it is necessary
to adapt very quickly and take adequate management decisions in time to make the
effective use of corporate information to be a pre-requisite for business success.
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Fig. 1. The block diagram of a control system for transport
Source: own elaboration based on Lakhno and Petrov, 2011a, p. 8
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Various functions of automated information management systems for trans-
portation:
– management of road, railway, air, and maritime transport;
– planning and optimizing terrestrial transport rounds;
– transportation mode and carrier selection;
– real-time vehicle tracking;
– service quality control;
– vehicle load and route optimization;
– transport costs and scheme simulation;
– shipment batching of orders;
– cost control, KPI (Key Performance Indicators) reporting, and statistics.
Since economic activities in Ukraine and CIS countries have increased in recent
years, the subsequent, nomenclature and volume of traffic has grown considerably,
causing, the load on all types of transportation (railway, motor, air, sea, and pipeline
transport) to increase. Along with the increasing capacities of the existing infrastructure
as well as the construction of new transportation capacities, there are great reserves in
enhancing the efficiency of the existing capacities (reduction of idle time due to more
accurate planning, etc.) and organization of automated information exchange among
consignors, carriers, and other participants in the transportation process. Various
forms of wireless communication technologies have been proposed for intelligent
transportation systems in Europe, the USA, and Asia. Short-range communications
(less than 500 yards) can be accomplished using IEEE 802.11 protocols. Theoretically,
the range of these protocols can be extended using Mobile ad-hoc networks. Longer-
range communications have been proposed using infrastructure networks such as
IEEE 802.16, GSM, or 3G. Long-range communications using these methods are well
established; but unlike the short-range protocols, these methods require extensive
and very expensive infrastructure deployment. There is lack of consensus as to which
business model should support this infrastructure.
Today, there is a wide range of software products of the leading vendors on the
market (Interbase, Oracle, IBM, SAP, Sun Microsystems, Informatica), all aimed at
ensuring the maximum quality of resolving such tasks. Service-oriented architecture
(SOA) and technologies of web-services based on open standards are very popular.
The modern approach of ensuring the reliability of information processes (IP) as
well as its protection from unauthorized access (UA) is supported at the international
level by standard ISO/IEC 15408. According to this approach, a reliable IP successfully
counteracts any specified threats of security at the given external conditions of its
operation. This leads to continuous improvement, as the ways and means of information
protection (MIP) as well as the ways and means of implementation of threats to
information security (IS), resulting that the appearance of a new MIP leads to its
bypassing by means of attack (Avizienis et al., 2004; Trivedi et al. 2001, p. 290).
Information security management has become a critical and challenging business
function due to reasons such as the rising cost of security breaches, increasing scale,
scope, and sophistication of information security attacks, complexity of information
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technology (IT) environments, shortage of qualified security professionals, diverse
security solutions from vendors, and compliance and regulatory obligations.
As part of the state and interstate programs of information to create informa-
tion systems, information-management and automated information system transport
industry (ISTI), as well as state integrated information system (SIIS).
The active expansion of the information and communication environment in
transport, accompanied by the emergence of new threats to information security (IS),
are evidenced by the statistics of incidents (see Figure 2) (Transportation & Logistics
2030 . . . , 2014, pp. 254–286).
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Fig. 2. The number of incidents of information security in transport
This, in turn, leads to the need for a new interpretation of the term ”reliability
of IP” that should be understood as a lack of security vulnerabilities, which can be
a consequence of the implementation of the various unintentional and intentional
threats. This eliminates a number of inconsistencies in the definition of conflict MIP
and attack.
In so doing, the reliability of IP should be characterized by its conformity to
some reference security model (invincible) circulation (processing and transmission)
of information. In this regard, there is a practical problem that such things are only
partially implemented in practice and is not directly reflected in the relevant standards
for architectural solutions of automated systems, such as transport (Lakhno and
Petrov, 2011a, p. 170) satisfying the common reference models.
Studies on the further development of models and methods of information security
based on the intelligent recognition of threats and information security in transport is
one of the main problems of information protection of the critical infrastructure state.
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The reason lies in the fundamental theoretical difficulties of modeling technologies
ensuring the reliability and protection of IP in automated data processing systems
of critical applications (ADPS CA) occurring when you try to connect a promising
approach to ensure the safety and protection of IP from UA with the flexibility of the
protective mechanisms.
The purpose of the article is to provide a description of the method and models
of recognizing information security threats that (unlike the existing systems) permits
us to take a final decision on the existence of a threat to existing and new classes of
attacks against information systems.
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The results of research allowing us to raise the level of protection of the automated and
intellectual information systems of motor transport (AIS) enterprises under conditions
of transportation intensification are presented in the work.
The top 10 information security threats for 2014:
1) malware (rising threat),
2) malicious insiders (rising threat),
3) exploited vulnerabilities (steady threat),
4) careless employees (steady threat),
5) mobile devices (rising threat),
6) social networking (rising threat),
7) social engineering (steady threat),
8) zero-day exploits (rising threat),
9) cloud computing security threats (rising threat).
10) cyberespionage (rising threat).
The 2014 CVE survey found that 90% of respondents detected computer security
breaches within the last year, and 73% reported financial losses due to these computer
breaches. Questions about the adequacy of the Ukrainian science, engineering, and
technology workforce are also rising to a chorus. Reported shortages of skilled workers
in the IT sector are only one example.
To evaluate the security of such a system, a security analyst needs to take into
account the effects of interactions of local vulnerabilities and find global vulnerabilities
introduced by interaction. This requires an appropriate modeling of the system. Impor-
tant information, such as the connectivity of elements in the system and security-related
attributes of each element, needs to be modeled so that analyses can be performed.
The analysis of security vulnerabilities, the most likely attack path, probability of
attack at various elements in the system, an overall security metric, etc., are useful
in improving the overall security and robustness of the system. Various aspects that
need to be considered while deciding on an appropriate model for representation and
analysis are ease of modeling, scalability of computation, and utility of the performed
analysis. The analysis of the protection of information systems and automated control
systems for transport companies has yielded the following results (period 2012–2014)
(Figs 3 and 4) (Worldwide Security . . . , 2014, p. 178).
122 A. Petrov, V. Lakhno, A. Korchenko
5%
10%
10%
25%50%
The distribution of sources breach in information systems External
disturbances
Vested interests
of the staff
Disgruntled
employees
Natural disasters
Unintentional
action
Fig. 3. The distribution of source breach AIS
26%
22%
14%
7%
5%
26%
The reasons for silence with information security incidents
Reluctance to negative publicity
Confidence that the police does not help
Fear that competitors are using the
situation to their advantage
Addressing the leadership more
effectively
Ignorance of what the police is
interested in protecting information
security
Other
Fig. 4. The reasons for silence with information security incidents
The decision of questions of the complex maintenance of security and stability
of functioning of the AIS in the conditions of unauthorized access (UNA), including,
influences of computer attacks, demands the system analysis and synthesis of possible
variants of construction of means of counteraction UNA means. At complex formation,
it is necessary to co-ordinate and interconnect the functions and parameters of the
EXPERT, protection frames of the information from UNA, anti-virus means, gateway
screens, communication equipment, general and special software, and perspective
means of counteraction to computer attacks.
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As a result of the systematic analysis of relevant information security threats,
Figure 5. The classification has been done with certain basic features and gives an
idea about the various options of a destructive impact on information resources.
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Source: own elaboration based on Lakhno and Petrov, 2011a, p. 20
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Security professionals are aware that cyber criminals have increasingly sophisti-
cated weapons at their disposal for maneuvering through online commerce systems
and stealing information. Traditional firewalls, IPS/IDS, and web application firewalls
do little to help online businesses understand the behavior of website visitors. Instead,
they narrowly focus on the network and server exploits only. The challenge of detecting
anomalous activity in real-time requires gathering various “big data” sources and
correlating them to understand user behavior. However, current methods of detection
fall short of this goal – individually, they examine only pieces of the behavior puzzle,
not the entire picture (Harel, 1987; Lau et al., 2000).
To determine the likelihood of a future adverse event, threats to AIS must be
analyzed in conjunction with the potential vulnerabilities and the controls in place for
the AIS. Impact refers to the magnitude of harm that could be caused by a threat’s
exercise of a particular vulnerability. The level of impact is governed by the potential
cyberattack impacts and, in turn, produces a relative value for the assets and resources
affected (e.g., the criticality and sensitivity of the information system components and
data).
Threat assessment system consists of the following steps:
1) system characterization (AIS),
2) threat identification,
3) identification vulnerability,
4) control analysis,
5) likelihood determination,
6) impact analysis,
7) risk determination,
8) control recommendations,
9) result documentation.
A threat is the potential for a particular threat-source to successfully exercise
a specific vulnerability. A vulnerability is a weakness that can be accidentally triggered
or intentionally exploited. A threat-source does not present a risk when there is no
vulnerability that can be exercised. In determining the likelihood of a threat, one must
consider threat-sources, potential vulnerabilities of AIS, and existing controls.
The goal of the second step is to identify the potential threat-sources and compile
a threat statement listing potential threat-sources that are applicable to the information
system being evaluated. A threat-source is defined as any circumstance or event with
the potential to cause harm to an information system. The common threat sources
can be natural, human, or environmental.
In assessing threat-sources, it is important to consider all potential threat-sources
that could cause harm to an automated information system and its processing envi-
ronment. Result – a threat statement containing a list of threat-sources that could
exploit system vulnerabilities.
The analysis of the threat to an automated information system must include
an analysis of the vulnerabilities associated with the system environment. The goal
of this step is to develop a list of system vulnerabilities (flaws or weaknesses) that
could be exploited by the potential threat-sources. Vulnerability: A flaw or weakness
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in system security procedures, design, implementation, or internal controls that could
be exercised (accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited) and result in a security
breach or a violation of the system’s security policy.
3. MODELS, METHODS, AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES
OF PROTECTION OF CORPORATE SYSTEMS OF TRANSPORT
BASED ON INTELLECTUAL IDENTIFICATION OF THREATS
The main task of discrete recognition and vulnerability search procedure (DRVSP)
building is to search of informative sub-descriptions (or description fragments) of
objects (Lakhno and Petrov, 2010).
We consider informative objects to be those that reflect certain regularities in the
description of objects used for training; that is, the presence or (vice versa) absence
of these fragments in the object that is being considered, allowin us to attribute it
to one of several classes. The fragments that are met in the descriptions of one-class
objects and cannot be met in the descriptions of other classes’ objects are considered
to be informative in DRVSP. The regarded fragments, as a rule, have a substantial
description in terms of designing information safety systems (ISS).
An elementary classifier is understood as a fragment in a description of a training
sample. A certain multitude of elementary classifiers with preset properties are built
for each {KL1, ...,KLl} class. Another problem is the presence of objects that are on
the borderline between classes {KL1, ...,KLl} and {Bpa1 , ..., Bpal } among the study
samples of objects. Each of these objects is not “typical” for its class, as it resembles
the descriptions of objects belonging to other classes. The presence of atypical objects
extends the length of fragments used to distinguish objects belonging to different
classes. Long fragments are less frequent in a new object, thus extending the number
of unrecognized objects.
The necessity of building effective realizations for discrete recognition and vulner-
ability search procedures is directly connected to problems of metric (quantitative)
characters of the informative fragments’ multitudes. The most important and techni-
cally complex are the problems of obtaining asymptotical estimates for typical number
values of (impasse) covering and the length of integer matrix (impasse) covering, and
also the problems of obtaining analogical estimates for permissible and maximum con-
junctions of a logical function, which are used for synthesis of circuit hardware-based
ISS solutions.
There is, as a rule, no reliable information about the structure of PA multitude
available while solving tasks connected with projecting an effective AIS information
safety system. That is why, having built a discrete recognition and vulnerability search
procedure algorithm, we cannot guarantee its high performance on new objects different
from {spa1, ..., spam}. Nevertheless, if the training samples are quite typical for the
considered multitude of objects, then the algorithm that makes infrequent mistakes
in studies will also show acceptable results with unknown objects (not included in
training samples). In this connection, the correctness of the discerning algorithm is
a problem to which should be paid great attention. The algorithm is considered to be
correct if it discerns all the training samples correctly.
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The main objective is to search DRVSP building fragments describing objects
(see Table 1).
Table 1. The knowledge base for the intelligent recognition of threats to information systems
Attributes
(signs class threats)
Signs
class threats
The
importance
of sign
The
universum
Terms
for the
lin-
guistic
evaluation
φu,. . . ,φv
The set of classes of
information security
threats
KL = {KL1, ...,KLn} ,
The set targets for
attack
PA = {PA1, ..., PAz} ,
The set of information
security
Npaj =
{
npa11 , ..., n
pau
j
}
,
The mathematical sets
of possible attackers
U = {u1, ..., ug},
The sets of incidents
NIS = {nis1, ..., nisf},
The sets of variants
attack on the system
AT = {AT1, ..., ATq}
and others
pax =
{pax1, ..., paxMI}
based on
NIS
−1 ¬
IZpaxj ¬ 1
[0, N0]
or
[0, 1],
c. u.
Critical and
uncritical
or
Identified,
partially
identified
threats,
undiag-
nosed
The state systems (AIS) SIK = {SIK1 , ..., SIKm}
Methods and means of protection of information systemsD77V = {D77V1 , ...,D77Vr }
The rules for result output IF (KL1 ∨ ... ∨ KLn ∨ SIKJ ∨ ... ∨ SIKm) THEN
D77Vr and
µdj (SIKi) =
hj∨
p=1
[
µy1 (y1) ∧ ... ∧ µφv (φv)
]
, p = 1, hj ,j = 1, MI, where
µy1 (y1),. . . , µφ (φu), µφ (φv) – membership function y1 , φu,. . . ,φv of the fuzzy
variables to terms; y1 – the state of information security {below critical, critical,
above the critical, high}; ∨ – logical OR, ∧ – logical AND as operations max
and min, respectively
The simplest example of a correct algorithm is the following: the considered
object span is compared to descriptions of every training sample {spa1, ..., spam}. In
case the span object’s description coincides with a description of a span training
sample, the span object is attributed to the same class as the spai object. In other
cases, the algorithm declines to recognize the object. There is no difficulty noticing
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that, though the foregoing algorithm is correct, it is not able to discern any object that
the description does not coincide with description of any training sample (Lakhno and
Petrov, 2011b, pp. 181–189).
Let us introduce the following symbols: let NPpa stand for a set of rpa , rpa ¬MI
different integer-valued characters of {paj1 , ...,pajr} kind.
Thus, the schematic circuit of the estimation algorithm building for information
safety systems is as follows: the whole range of different NPpa = {paj1 , ...,paMI},
rpa ¬MI type sub multitudes is picked out inside the {pa1 , ..., pajMI} character system.
Later, the picked sub multitudes are named reference multitudes of the algorithm, and
their whole range is designated by ΩMI.
Further, let us set the following parameters:
– pospa is a parameter characterizing the significance of a spai, i = 1, 2, ..., PA target
(object);
– poNPpa is a parameter characterizing the significance of an object belonging to
a reference multitude NPpa ∈ ΩMI.
Further comes the estimation procedure. The considered object span is compared
to each training sample spai of every reference multitude.
A Γ(spa,KL) estimation of spaobject belonging to KL class is calculated for each
vulnerability class of AIS KL, KL ∈ {KL1, ...,KLl}in the following way:
Γ(spa,KL) =
1
|LWKL|
∑
spai∈KL
∑
NPpa∈ΩMI
pospa · poNPpa ·BN(spa, spai, NPpa) (1)
where |LWKL| = |KL ∩ {spa1, ..., spaMI}|.
The span object is attributed to the class that has the highest estimate. In case
there are several classes with the highest estimate, discerning fails. Obviously, the
ready-built algorithm is not always correct. The correctness of this algorithm requires
compliance with a linear inequalities system of the following type:
Γ(spa1,KL1) > Γ(spa1,KL2), Γ(spaMI1 ,KL1) >
> Γ(spaMI1 ,KL2), Γ(spaMI1+1 ,KL2) > Γ(spaMI1+1 ,KL1)
. . .
Γ(spaMI ,KL2) > Γ(spaMI,KL1)
(2)
The solution of the system comes up to choice of pospai , i = 1, 2, ..., PA, and
poNPpa , NPpa ∈ ΩMI parameters. In case the system is not combined, its maximum
combined subsystem should be found, and the solution of this subsystem defines the
parameter points for pospaiand poNPpa .
Let’s regard the situation when the objects of the considered PA multitude are
described by the characters each possessing values of the {0, 1, ..., kpa − 1} multitude.
Let’s associate the (σDOP, NPpa) elementary classifier, where σDOP =
(σDOP1 , ...,σDOPr), NPpa is a set of characters numbered j1, ...jrpa , with an elementary
conjunction < = pσDOP1axj1 ... p
σDOPrpa
axjrpa
.
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If spa = (αpa1, ...,αpaMI) is an object of the PA multitude, then obviously
BN(σDOP, spa, NPpa) = 1 only in the case when (αpa1, ...,αpaMI) ∈ NI<, where NI<
is a truth interval for elementary conjunction <.
Let us show that building a multitude of (KLl) = (Bpal ) class elementary classifiers
for the models previously considered in the article adds up to finding permissible and
maximum conjunctions of the characteristic (KLl) = (Bpal ) class function, which is
a double-valued logical function possessing different values for training samples of KLl
& KLl.
The procedure of threat recognition for a certain target [that is, the spa =
(αpa1, ..., αpaMI) object] is carried out based on the calculation built with the help of
elementary conjunctions. Using the algorithm of conjunction calculation by class cover-
ings seems to be the most economical in this case. A characteristic function ofKL1 class
of information threats is a certain logical function FKL, possessing value 0 for descrip-
tions of span = (αpan1, ..., αpanMI) belonging to KLl and possessing value 1 for other
character sets belonging to EMIKL. Here, E
MI
KL is a multitude of all rpa long sets. A permis-
sible conjunction for FKL is associated with the KL1 class covering, and the maximum
conjunction for FKL is associated with its terminal covering. A permissible (maximum)
conjunction < is used to determine if the span = (αpan1, ..., αpanMI) object belongs to
(KLl) = (Bpal ) class, in case (αpa1, ..., αpaMI) /∈ NI<.
Thus, building a multitude of elementary classifiers for the simulated class of
information treats adds up to the following Lakhno and Petrov, 2011c, pp. 230–251):
1) specifying a characteristic function;
2) building a disjunctive normal form that realizes this function; the biggest difficulty
is building disjunctive normal forms from maximum conjunctions (shortened
disjunctive normal forms) of a characteristic function;
3) calculating a permissible (maximum) conjunction <, which determines the object
that belongs to a certain class of threats.
For each class, the number of threats to information security signs ranged from
3 to 9. Informational content of a sign can change in the range from −1 to +1. To evalu-
ate the effectiveness of recognition procedures used cross-validation method. Examples
of the results of performance testing method DRVSP are shown in Figures 6–9.
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software and databases”
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Without
education
Study 5
features
Study 7
features
Study 9
features
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 o
f 
th
re
a
t 
d
et
ec
ti
o
n
, 
%
Fig. 9. The probability of recognizing the
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In the following part of article, the question of which application of models
of intellectual recognition of threats for the task of describing the operation modes of
information systems with blocking of the non-uniform flows of requests is considered.
These non-uniform flows of requests meet in case of difficult invasions into information
systems; for example, in the modules of systems of client-bank, e-business, e-logistics,
e-cargo, e-ticket, GSM-R, VSAT systems, etc.
During tests of the developed expert system, the task of detecting DoS/DDoS
attacks is selected. The knowledge base from nine rules was used. The knowledge base
is capable of defining seven types of attacks of DoS/DdoS. In addition, known signs of
attacks and additional signs for the description of a status of system (Tables 1 and 2)
were used.
Table 2. Signs of a DoS/DDoS
A partial state variable
of the information system
and Network
Universum Terms for linguisticassessment
φ1– indicator of current risks [15–19] [0,1], arbitrary
units (A.U.).
low, medium-low, medium,
medium-high, and high
φ2 – acceptable level of risk informa-
tion [20–22]
[0,1], A.U. critical and uncritical
. . . . . . . . . . . .
φ13 – presence of HTTP GET pack-
ets
[0,1], A.U. low, medium-low, medium,
medium-high, and high
φ14 – presence of HTTP flood pack-
ets
[0,1], A.U. low, medium-low, medium,
medium-high, and high
. . . . . . . . . . . .
φz – other factors [0,1], A.U. low, medium-low, medium,
medium-high, and high
The examples list factors that affect the productivity of information systems
under the threat of DDoS attacks (presented in the form of linguistic variables) for
which the selected set and universal terms. According constructed fuzzy knowledge
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base, representing a set of fuzzy rules "IF-THEN" that define the relationship between
input and output variables. For fuzzy knowledge bases composed logical equation
(Lakhno and Petrov, 2012, pp. 221–248).
For example, a system of logical equations for intelligent recognition of DDoS-
attacks Application layer ("slow» HTTP GET flood and "slow» HTTP POST flood),
we can write this:
µdj (S) =
hj∨
p=1
[
µy
jp
1 (y1) ∧ µφ
jp
O (φ13) ∧ µφ
jp
O (φ14)
]
, p = 1, hj , j = 1,M (3)
where:
µy
jp
1 (y1), µφ
jp
O (φ13),
µφ
jp
O (φ14)
–
membership function variables y1, φ13, φ14 their fuzzy
terms yjp1 , φ
jp
13, φ
jp
14, respectively,
S – the state protection of information systems against
DoS/DDoS (Xiang et al., 2004, pp. 15–17; Mirkovic et al.,
2004, p. 400),
y1 – the state of information {below the critical (bc), critical (cr),
above the critical (ac), high (h)} (Chapman and Ward, 2003,
p. 390; Atighetchi et al., 2004, pp. 25–33; Chi et al., 2001,
p. 290),
∨ – logical OR, ∧ – logical AND, like max and min, respectively.
Figure 10 shows the main results obtained during the test simulation recognition
DoS/Ddos attacks.
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Fig. 10. Probability of detecting DDoS attacks
According to the results of the experiment, the DRVSP DoS/DDoS attacks, the
following results were obtained: for the errors of the first kind (false positives) – 10.2%;
for the errors of the second kind (the number of detected attacks) – 2.9% (Fig. 11).
The discrete recognition search procedures allow us to create an “intelligent” system
in which the detectors can effectively detect not only known but also unknown cyber-
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attacks. The structure, functioning, and learning algorithms of discrete recognition
search procedure detectors are presented. The results of the studies that prove the
effectiveness of the proposed approach are also presented.
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Fig. 11. The value of error detection of DDos attacks of the first and second kinds
4. RESULTS
In the aftermath of the DDoS attacks, security experts identified network intrusion
detection as one of several technologies that can lead to improved network security.
While intrusion-detection processes alone cannot prevent or defend against security at-
tacks, they can serve as a valuable source of information for security administrators
about the types of activity attackers may be using against them. Network intrusion
detection (NID) is the process of identifying network activity that can lead to the
compromise of a security policy.
With the fuzzy input sets defined, the security administrator can then construct
the rules of the fuzzy system. Fuzzy rules are written using common-sense experiences
by the security administrator. The rule designer seeks to define rules that cover as
much of the input space as possible. Using tools such as the Matlab Fuzzy Toolbox,
the designer can check the input rule space to ensure that the fuzzy rules cover the
input space and that all output responses are defined (Fig. 12).
The successful attack on the AIS (particularly of type denial of service) does
not necessarily require generating lots of server requests or decreasing bandwidth.
A high degree of success probability can be reached by using the brittleness connected
with the generation of a low-intensity priority thread; for example, by varying such
parameters as packet speed (low-rate DoS attacks), quantity of packets with the zero
rate as related to RTT, pulse length, etc.
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The research has allowed us to develop the following sequence of IPM modeling
stages in AISTE structure:
– to make a scheme of a multiphase queuing system (USYS) for the calculation of
IPM capacious and time characteristics with use of MATLAB 2009 + Simulink;
– to execute the formalization of all possible states of the model system. To determine
unsafe states;
– to determine the intensity and probability of the IPM transition from one state
to another;
– to determine the characteristics of AISTE states as time and intensity functions
of entering streams of requirements according to a transition graph, taking into
account the differential or recurrent equations systems.
We have implemented the graphs attack in a combination of Prolog and Delphi
(Fig. 13). Experimental results show that our logical attack graph tool is very efficient
and can handle networks with thousands of machines.
We show screenshots of a few examples of Network Attack Graphs. States in the
graph have been ranked according to the ranking algorithm based on PageRank. We set
the damping factor to 0.85. For each error state, the intensity of color is proportional
to the relative rank of that state in the Attack Graph.
The security metric based on the total rank of error states is a quantitative guide
for comparing Attack Graphs. A system administrator could fix a particular security
property, making changes to his network configuration and comparing the Attack
Graphs obtained using this security metric. Thus, he can determine the relative utility
of different security measures. He could also fix the system model and observe changes
in the ranks of the Attack Graph based on varying the security property from a weak
to a strong one. For example, consider the computer network shown in Figure 12, which
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has interconnected computer hosts with some services and software vulnerabilities
on each host. The total rank of error states in the changed Attack Graph is 0.045,
which shows that the network becomes relatively more secure. Now, suppose the
administrator also changes the security property to “Intruder cannot get root access
on ip1 ”.
Figure 14 shows the Attack Graph of the network with respect to the changed
security property. The total rank of error states in the Attack Graph is 0.29. This
shows that host ip1 is more likely to be attacked than host ip2 in the changed network
configuration.
Fig. 13. Comparison in Delphi Network Attack Graphs
Fig. 14. Comparison in Delphi Network Attack Graphs
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5. CONCLUSIONS OF THE WORK
The operation is devoted to research and development of theoretical methods, models,
and software products for support of information security on transportation.
The main results of our research:
1) The method of intellectual recognition of threats based on the logic functions
and indistinct sets has been developed. The method allows us to increase the
efficiency of recognizing threats for information security to 85–98% (depending
on the threat class). In addition, it is possible, to use a method for creating new
systems of information security on transportation.
2) The offered models have been realized in the form of an expert system, which can
increase the efficiency of recognizing computer invasions DDoS to 97–98%.
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